Abstract Empiricists claim that in accepting a scientific theory one should not commit oneself to claims about things that are not observable in the sense of registering on human perceptual systems (according to Van Fraassen's constructive empiricism) or experimental equipment (according to what I call "liberal empiricism"). They also claim scientific theories should be accepted or rejected on the basis of how well they save the phenomena in the sense delivering unified descriptions of natural regularities among things that meet their conditions for observability. I argue that empiricism is both unfaithful to real world scientific practice, and epistemically imprudent, if not incoherent. To illuminate scientific practice and save regularity phenomena one must commit oneself to claims about causal mechanisms that can be detected from data, but do not register directly on human perceptual systems or experimental equipment. I conclude by suggesting that empiricists should relax their standards for acceptable beliefs.
'Saving the phenomena'
Jim Woodward and I called our first paper 'Saving the Phenomena' because we wanted to rescue the distinction between data and phenomena from the neglect it suffers at the hands of logical empiricists, their followers, and those who criticize them without giving up some of their central assumptions. What we call phenomena are processes, causal factors, effects, facts, regularities and other pieces of ontological furniture to be found in nature and in the laboratory. They exist and are as they are independently of interests, concepts, and theoretical commitments of scientists, and political, historical, social, and cultural factors that influence them. Some phenomena are observable, but many are not. Appropriating what Bernard Williams said in another connection, to know about phenomena is to have …knowledge of a reality that exists independently of that knowledge, and indeed…independently of any thought or experience. (Williams 1978, p. 78) Such knowledge '…is of what is there anyway' (ibid).
Our original examples of phenomena included neuronal electrical signaling, weak neutral current events, solar neutrino fluxes, the melting point of lead, and in the motions of moons and planets. Instances of phenomena owe their occurrences, behaviors, and characteristic features to relatively small numbers of causal factors that co-occur and interact with one another in pretty much the same way in a range of different circumstances and locations. They can be expected … to have stable repeatable characteristics which will be detectable by means of a variety of different procedures which may yield quite different kinds of data. (Bogen and Woodward 1988, p. 317) Phenomena are the kinds of things it is reasonable for scientists to try to predict and explain systematically by appeal to local or widespread causal mechanisms. They are the kinds of things theories are tested against.
Data, by contrast, are records of effects in investigators' sensory systems or experimental equipment. Their epistemic usefulness depends on features whose possession reflects the causal influence that phenomena 1 or closely related causal factors 2 exert on their production. Investigators apply background knowledge and inferential techniques to identify such features and look for answers to questions about phenomena. 1 The height of the mercury in a thermometer can help indicate something about an infectious disease by virtue of its causal connection to a patient's temperature. Investigators can use spatial configurations in photographs of tracks caused by particles traveling in a bubble chamber to study subatomic physical phenomena.
2 Edouard Machery pointed out to me that data used to study regularity phenomena reflect the influence of causal factors that should not be confused with the regularities themselves. His example was test score data indicating an inverse correlation between male and female subjects' performances on certain cognitive tasks. The regularities don't interact with experimentalists or experimental equipment to cause data. Epistemically useful features of the data reflect the causal influence of cognitive and other factors that sustain the inverse correlation. The data used to calculate the melting point of lead reflect changes in heat and phase state change effects like vaporization rather than regularities among them.
Epistemically useful data can seldom be produced except by processes that mark them with features due to causal factors that are too numerous, too different in kind, and too irregular in behavior for any single theory to take into account. For example, the data Bernard Katz used to study neuronal signaling was influenced by causal factors peculiar to the makeup and operation of his instruments, the positions of electrodes used to stimulate and record electrical activity in neurons, physiological changes in nerves deteriorating during experimentation, not to mention causes as far removed from the phenomenon of interest as vibrations that shook the equipment in response to the heavy tread of Katz's mentor, A.V. Hill on the stairs outside the laboratory. Some factors influenced the data only as mutually interacting components of shifting assemblies of causal influences. Such multiplicity, heterogeneity, and complexity typically renders data points immune to the kinds of explanation to which phenomena are susceptible.
Constructive and liberal empiricism
Woodward and I appealed to differences between data and phenomena to correct a number of mistaken ideas about scientific practice. One of them is the empiricist idea that (ignoring practical applications) what scientific theories are supposed to do is to "save the phenomena" in the sense of describing, predicting, retrodicting, and systematizing "observables". 3 As Hempel put it, Empirical science has two major objectives: to describe particular phenomena in the world of our experience and to establish general principles by which they can be explained and predicted. The explanatory and predictive principles of a scientific discipline …characterize general patterns and regularities to which… individual phenomena conform and by virtue of which their occurrence can be systematically anticipated. (Hempel 1970, p. 653) For Hempel 'explaining' means exhibiting general regularities to which the explanandum conforms. He emphatically does not mean describing causally productive mechanisms, let alone imperceptible causal influences, that give rise to things we experience.
Osiander's forward to Copernicus' On the Revolutions' is a locus classicus for this conception of science. 4 Since he cannot in any way attain to the true causes…[the astronomer] will adopt whatever suppositions enable… [celestial] motions to be computed correctly from the principles of geometry for the future as well as the past…[These] hypotheses need not be true or even probable…[I]f they provide a calculus consistent with the observations, that alone is enough. (Osiander 1543 /1992 Duhem held that 3 Some of our other targets were the myth of theory laden perceptual observations (Bogen 2009) , and IRS, the logical empiricist view that scientific reasoning should be modeled in terms of Inferential Relations among Sentential structures (Bogen and Woodward 2005) . 4 But see Barker and Goldstein (1998) .
[a] physical theory is not a [causal] explanation. It is a system of mathematical propositions, deduced from a small number of principles, which aim to represent as simply, as completely, and as exactly as possible a set of experimental laws… Duhem's experimental laws are simplified or idealized general descriptions of experimentally produced observable effects.
Concerning the very nature of things, or the realities hidden under the phenomena [described by experimental laws]…a theory…tells us absolutely nothing, and does not claim to teach us anything. (Duhem 1991, p. 19) That amounts to saying that theoreticians should limit their attention to regularities among data. Woodward and I hold to the contrary that for the most part, scientific theories are incapable of predicting or explaining data. They are required instead to answer questions about phenomena, many of which are unobservable in the sense that they do not register directly on human perceptual systems, or upon experimental equipment.
Van Fraassen's constructive empiricism is a familiar version of the idea we reject. It holds that in accepting a theory one should not commit oneself to anything more than the claim that it provides '…true account of what is observable'. 5 In particular, it requires no commitment to claims whose truth presupposes, assumes or implies the existence of non-observable causes and causal processes. In this respect constructive empiricism agrees with Osiander's idea that scientists shouldn't claim to know hidden causes of observable things. But its conditions on observability rule out claims about a great many phenomena Duhem and Hempel think scientific theories should try to save.
For Van Fraassen, to be observable is to be perceptible by the unaided senses of a properly situated human observer under favorable observation conditions. Thus distant moons too far away to see with without a telescope are observable only because we could see them with our naked eyes if we were close enough to them under favorable observation conditions. 6 By contrast, things humans can't see without electron microscopes or detect without Geiger counters under any conditions are not observable (Van Fraassen 1980, p. 16) .
Van Fraassen's conception of observability brings constructive empiricism into conflict with Duhem's conception of science, along with real world scientific practice that departs from Duhem. 7 To estimate the velocity of the nervous impulse (we call it the action potential), Helmholtz applied an electrical stimulus to one end of a nerve fiber whose other end was attached to a bit of muscle and recorded the time at which he saw the muscle contract. To produce a velocity estimate he also needed data on the temporal interval between the application of the stimulus and the beginning of the contraction. Because 'our senses are not capable of directly perceiving an individual moment of time with such a small duration,' he could not produce this data without recourse to 'artificial methods of observation' (Olesko and Holmes 1994, p. 84) . By this Helmholtz meant using a perceptible effect on a piece of experimental equipment as a measure of an imperceptible quantity. To this end he set up a galvanometer so it would respond to electrical activity by deflecting a magnetized needle. He could see (observe non-artificially) the arc the needle moved through when he stimulated the nerve. Assuming that the length of the arc was proportional to the temporal duration of the motor impulse, Helmholtz could use the former to measure the latter (ibid). Watching the dial to estimate a temporal duration is by no means analogous to observing a marking on a distant bird one sees through a telescope. The telescope enables the observer to visually experience the marking and attend to it consciously. Because the observer could see the marking without a telescope if the bird was close enough, Van Fraassen would call this an observation. But Helmholtz could not see the duration of the nervous impulse he measured; all he could see was the arc through which the needle moved. If Helmholtz had limited his investigations to things he could observe only in Van Fraassen's sense of that term, he could not have used artificial methods of observation to calculate the velocity of the nervous impulse. As this example illustrates, working scientists (Duhem, for one) are happy to talk about observation in connection with things that register on their equipment rather than their senses. Those who believe the goal of science is to describe, predict, and systematize observations can improve their chances of doing justice to research in the neurosciences, molecular biology, particle physics, and elsewhere by rejecting constructive empiricism in favor of what I'll call liberal empiricism. Liberal empiricism believes scientists should commit themselves only to the truth of claims about things that register on their senses or experimental equipment. This fits real world science better than constructive empiricism. But high energy physicists, microbiologists, and scientists in other fields commit themselves to claims about phenomena like weak neutral current interactions that do not even meet liberal empiricism's conditions for observability. 8
Scientists often try to do more than empiricists think they should
Here are two examples of scientists who succeeded in saving the phenomena in the sense of computing, describing, and predicting instances of regularities among the quantities they studied, apologized for not having accomplished more, and exhorted others to join them in looking for hidden, causal mechanisms that sustain the regularities they saved.
The Hodgkin-Huxley (HH) current equation
The action potential HH studied is a wave of electrical activity that travels at uniform velocity and amplitude down a neuronal axon away from the cell body. It consists of a series of electrical currents carried by charged ions moving in and out of the axon membrane at one place after another toward the synapse. The ion flows are promoted and damped as local membrane permeability changes in response to changes in membrane potential. 9 The HH total current equation
provides a unifying description, and predicts instances of regularities among electrical quantities involved in the action potential. In particular, it describes the cross membrane current (I) as the sum of a capacity current (C M dV/dt), and three cross membrane ion currents-a potassium current (g n4
Na (V − V Na )), and a "leakage current" (g l (V−V l )) due largely to Cl − flow. Some of the variables and constants represent unobservable physical quantities. 'g K ', 'g Na ', and 'g l ' symbolize maximal membrane conductances for the potassium current, the sodium current, and the leakage current, respectively calculated from measurements of electrical activity (Hodgkin and Huxley 1952, pp. 505, 518) . Values of V − V k , V − V Na and V − V l are differences between actual membrane potential, V, and the membrane potentials (V K , V Na , V L ) at which there is no net potassium, sodium, or leakage ion flow. None of these quantities qualify as observable in Van Fraassen's sense, but all of them are calculated from voltage data. By contrast, n, m, and h are weighting constants devised to bring the equation into line with actual values of the cross membrane current. HH emphasize the availability of mathematically acceptable alternatives that could have delivered equally good quantitative descriptions of the ion currents. They chose their constants for their mathematical convenience (Hodgkin and Huxley 1952, pp. 505, 512) .
To establish the relevance of their equation to the action potential, HH used it to derive predictions of some crucial features of action potential propagation (Hodgkin and Huxley 1952, pp. 518-528 ). The total current equation and the predictions they derived from it agreed to an acceptable approximation with an impressive variety of results obtained in limited but impressive range of experiments and background conditions.
A liberal empiricist would welcome these results, asking for nothing more in the way of improvements than a broadening of their range of application and a reduction of discrepancies between predicted and experimentally detected electrical magnitudes like those HH discuss at Hodgkin and Huxley (1952, pp. 541-544) . A Duhemian empiricist would hope the regularities the current equation describes could be shown to be instances of wider regularities. But HH wanted something that neither constructive nor liberal empiricism countenance. They express dissatisfaction over their failure to provide physical interpretations of their weighting constants, and their inability to explain the regularities they described (Hodgkin and Huxley 1952, p. 541) . The following illustrates what they thought was missing. HH speculated that if there were some molecules that encouraged, and other molecules that discouraged ion flow, they could explain the membrane sodium conductance as depending on and varying with …the number of sites on the inside of the membrane which are occupied simultaneously by three activating molecules, but are not blocked by an inactivating molecule. (Hodgkin and Huxley 1952, p. 512) Then 'm' in the current equation could be interpreted as representing the proportion of activating molecules on the inside of the membrane, and 'h' as representing the proportion of inactivating molecules on the outside of the membrane (ibid). HH warn that agreements between calculated and experimental results are not good reasons to believe their speculation is correct. The most they show is that the current equations deliver empirically acceptable descriptions … of the time-course of the changes in permeability to sodium and potassium. An equally satisfactory description of the…data could no doubt have been achieved by equations of very different form. (Hodgkin and Huxley 1952, p. 541) In particular predictive success does not argue for the existence of the activating and blocking molecules they speculated about (ibid). Over a decade later Kenneth Cole said that the greatest challenge the HH equations presented to investigators of the action potential … was-and still is-the explanation of the only unknowns in the HodgkinHuxley formulation, the sodium and potassium conductances. These were described so precisely and were such adequate expressions of so much physiology that any theory which could explain them quantitatively would be sufficient-for physiology at least. Conversely, a theory which failed to account for these conductances seemed destined to be incomplete or wrong in some, probably important, aspect. Theory thus has a clear and shining goal. (Cole 1968, pp. 292-293) The dominant experimental research undertaken in pursuit of this goal assumes that unobservable (though detectable) ions carry electrical currents by flowing through unobservable (though detectable) channels embedded in the neuronal membrane. Contrary to Osianderian empiricism, ions, ion channels, and their components were not posited to facilitate computations. They were understood to be real physical structures that respond to and exert causal influences. Bertil Hille and others worked to find out how the channels were gated, how ions moved through them, and what structural and functional features decided which ions could pass through which channels (Hille 2001, pp. 45-51, 539-602) . Roderick MacKinnon and his associates crystallized potassium channels and applied spectrographic techniques to produce computer generated images with which to investigate the structure of the channel and the spatial configurations of its parts at different stages of voltage gating (Jiang et al. 2003a (Jiang et al. , pp. 33-41, 2003b . This was difficult and delicate work. The investigators said they had to attach molecules to stabilize the channels, apply detergents to wash away surrounding lipids, introduce toxins to immobilize channel components during crystallization, and bombard the crystals with X-Rays to produce spectrographic data. It is unthinkable that anyone who didn't believe in ions and ion channels could take such pains to manipulate them. Neither they nor the X-Rays they used are perceptible in any but a Pickwickian sense of that term. The crystallographic images are computer generated from instructions constrained by inputs from the spectrographic equipment. It is a mistake to think the investigators could see ion channels in them in anything like the way one can see Rachel Maddow in a photograph or on TV. The channels MacKinnon visualized were supposed to be, and as far as we know, actually are, real world gating mechanisms that support, rather than enable the computation of the regularities HH described. This is to say that the Nobel prize MacKinnon won for his ion channel research couldn't very well have been awarded by a committee of constructive or liberal empiricists.
A. V. Hill's tiny rainstorms
Nerve fibers release what A. V. Hill called transmission heat at a steady rate during, and perhaps for a very short time after, action potential propagation. 10 After that, heat is emitted at a steeply declining rate for around 2 s. This is the first, or A phase of what Hill calls recovery heat release. The second or B phase is a longer lasting emission of gradually declining recovery heat. Hill uses the expression 'Ae −at ' to describe the exponentially declining rate of A phase heat release, and 'Be −bt ' for phase B. In Hill's recovery heat equation,
y is the rate of recovery heat emission beginning immediately after the completion of an action potential at time, t 0 . A is the magnitude of heat at t 0 . B is its magnitude at the end of phase A. t is elapsed time. e −at is the exponential change in the rate at which heat is released during phase A. e −bt is the exponential change in phase B emission. a and b are uninterpreted constants chosen so that A/a differs from B/b as the total heat released during phase A differs from the total heat released during phase B (Hill 1932a (Hill , p. 155, 1932b . Heat magnitudes and time courses calculated from Hill's equation agree acceptably well with experimental results. There's no reason for an empiricist to care about whether constants can be given physical interpretations as long as they facilitate computations of the quantities of interest. But Hill was no more content than HH to use uninterpreted constants to save the regularity phenomenon he studied. In his Liversidge lecture he emphasized that although he had succeeded in describing recovery heat release he had failed to explain them. To explain them he would have to discover whether a and b correspond to real factors, and if so, how they influence heat release. More importantly, he says, he would have to identify the relevant physiological process. Because A and B heat are released when the nerve is not spiking, he would also have to explain why resting nerves waste so much energy (Hill 1932b, p. 55 ).
Hill approaches these questions by looking to analogous physiological phenomena. In doing its osmotic work, the kidney wastes an enormous amount of energy on heat emission (Hill 1932b, p. 55) . Muscles waste a great deal of energy in recovering from contraction. In these and related physiological processes ions are moved through membranes until they are distributed as required for the relevant systems to continue to function (e.g., for muscle fibers to resume their contracting). Inefficiency seems to be the rule for the mechanisms that do this kind of work. The propagation of an action potential disrupts the distribution of ions and charges inside and outside of the nerve membrane. The nerve cannot fire again until the original distributions have been restored. Hill speculates that the restoration is achieved by an inefficient mechanism that wastes heat energy as it moves ions and charges back through the membrane (Hill 1932b, pp. 55-56) . He exhorts chemists, physicists and engineers to join in the search for an explanation of the workings of the restorative mechanism and claims that a good explanation would promote our understanding of 'one of the most important facts in nature' (Hill 1932b, p. 57) . He expects this research project to be as time consuming, difficult, and important as the equally non-empiricist investigation of the structure of the atom (ibid).
It's one thing to try to satisfy an empiricist by improving or replacing Hill's equation to provide for new and better computations of restorative heat emission. It's quite another to look for the causes that interested Hill.
Hill did a lot of fiddling and adjusting to avoid experimental artifacts. The natural way to understand what he was doing and why his adjustments succeeded is to invoke causal facts Hill knew about. For example, Hill used a thermopile to produce an electrical current that varied with the temperature of a bit of nerve fiber 11 (Hill 1932a, p. 116) . To control the nerve's temperature and shield the recording equipment from ambient heat, Hill sealed them in the core of a double walled container. To see how the nerve behaved at 0 • C, he filled the space between the walls with crushed ice. For experiments at higher temperatures he used paraffin oil. To bring the inner temperature to within a desired range above 0 • C he pumped in air from the laboratory. For lower temperature experiments he used oxygen. When the core was cooled slowly or when oxygen was introduced, the equipment sometimes recorded 'curious fluctuations' in nerve temperature. Hill supposed the fluctuations were artifacts of warming caused by little rainstorms in the chamber. The rainstorms occurred when the charge on the wire he used to stimulate the nerve initiated condensation in supersaturated air surrounding the thermopile. Assuming that the gases he used to manipulate the temperature inside the core contributed to supersaturation, he took pains to remove moisture from his oxygen and adjusted the temperature of the room to keep the air he pumped into the container from getting colder than the air in the core. As Hill expected, his tinkering eliminated the unwanted fluctuations (Hill 1932a, p. 119 ).
Hill's tinkering was motivated by beliefs about the existence and influence of causal factors he could not observe. He believed the curious temperature fluctuations should be eliminated because they were caused by condensing moisture rather than changes in post transmission heat. He was committed to beliefs about how heat from the nerve acted on his apparatus, how supersaturation could lead to artifactual temperature fluctuations, and how warming the air and drying the oxygen could prevent them. It's not obvious how we could explain what Hill was doing and why it worked while remaining agnostic about the causal factors he manipulated.
When Carl Craver made a similar point in discussion, John Carson objected that even if you can't make sense out of experimental practices unless you assume the experimenters believe in unobservable causes, it doesn't follow that you have to believe in them too. After all, we explain ancient medical practices as motivated by beliefs about humoral disease mechanisms that we don't share. Why must empiricists assent to all the beliefs they ascribe to the experimenters?
The rest of this paper is devoted [a] to answering Carson's objection, and [b] to arguing that without commitment to the truth of claims about causal factors and processes that humans can't perceive and experimental equipment can't register, it is epistemically imprudent, if not incoherent to believe in regularity phenomena that empiricists think scientific theories are supposed to save.
What's wrong with constructive and liberal empiricism
The only argument I've been able to find for constructive empiricism that seems at all plausible comes from Van Fraassen. Van Fraassen says that a scientific claim is empirically adequate …exactly if what it says about the observable things and events in the world is true. (Van Fraassen 1980, p. 12) Assume that you can't or shouldn't commit yourself to the correctness of a theory unless you believe in the empirical adequacy of what is says and implies about observables. Because 'empirical adequacy coincides with truth' for every claim that 'is solely about what is observable' accepting a theory commits you to the truth of what it says and implies about them (Van Fraassen 1980, p. 72) . Thus if you have acceptably good reasons to believe that what a theory says or implies about observables is empirically adequate, epistemic prudence condones commitment to just that much of the theory. 12 But most scientific theories make general claims (including predictions) whose empirical adequacy depends upon things and events that have occurred but were not observed, are now occurring unobserved, and still others that won't be available for observation until later on. Gravitational theories are obvious examples. Most instances of the regularities they address have not yet, and never will be observed. Thus, as Van Fraassen acknowledges, one cannot commit oneself to the empirical adequacy of a general scientific theory without taking some epistemic risks (Van Fraassen 1980, p. 69) . It would be absurd for a scientist to try to save regularities he didn't believe in. It would be equally absurd for an agnostic philosopher to maintain that scientists should compute, describe, predict, and unify descriptions of them. Thus liberal and constructive empiricists must acknowledge, e.g., that no matter how many empirical tests a gravitational theory passes, it will always be somewhat epistemically risky to accept it. The argument for constructive empiricism is that the risk becomes unacceptably high if one goes on to commit oneself to the claims the theory makes about things that cannot be observed. Therefore epistemic prudence is supposed to preclude commitments to anything the theory says or implies about causes the unaided senses can't perceive (Van Fraassen 1985) . We can transform this into an equally plausible argument for liberal empiricism by relaxing Van Fraassen's conditions for observability and empirical adequacy to admit imperceptibles that register on experimental equipment.
Something like the same thing applies to Carson's question because one can't commit oneself to the empirical adequacy of Hill's reasons for cooling his oxygen or warming his laboratory without committing oneself to the empirical adequacy of generalizations about unobserved as well as observed electric charges and condensation effects. Agnosticism about whether unobserved as well as observed charges condense water out of unobserved as well as observed supersaturated gases makes it epistemically imprudent to commit oneself to Hill's reasons for thinking the curious temperature fluctuations he recorded were condensation artifacts or to his explanation of how he eliminated them.
But it is more epistemically imprudent than any empiricist can tolerate, 13 to commit yourself to the truth (nearness to truth, or acceptably high probability) of empirical generalizations that outstrip the available observational evidence without secure (i.e., truth conducive) inductive arguments to support them. For reasons that derive from John Norton's material theory of induction, I submit that constructive and liberal empiricists can't avoid such imprudence.
John Stuart Mill observed that even if all the swans you've seen are white, and even though all the humans you've seen have heads that grow above their shoulders, the belief that no living human's head grows under her shoulders is more credible than the belief that no swans are black (Mill 1967, p. 205) .
Mill was right. Genetic, developmental, metabolic, and environmental factors rule out such drastic anatomical variations while rendering black swans improbable but not impossible. Whether it's epistemically prudent for you to believe a generalization that outstrips the available empirical evidence, and how prudent it is for you to believe it depends on what else you believe and how reasonable it is for you to believe it. The more you know about the relevant biological facts, the more prudent it is for you to believe there are no living humans with under the shoulder heads. Given enough background knowledge about the mechanisms that influence anatomical structure, it's imprudent for you not to believe that all human heads grow above the shoulders. But the most important thing Mill's example can teach us about empiricism is that it is not epistemically prudent to accept the generalization unless you know something about the relevant biology. Maybe you don't need to know much, but you do need to know something.
I learned what I've just said about Mill from John Norton's account of why the inference from (a) 'Some samples of the element bismuth melt at 271 • C' to (b) 'All samples of the element bismuth melt at 271 • C' (call it the bismuth induction)
is secure even though the inference (call it the wax induction) from (c) 'Some samples of wax melt at 91 • C' to (d) 'All samples of wax melt at 91 • C.' is infirm Since both arguments have the same logical form and both are deductively invalid, there is no formal explanation for the difference. Norton's idea is that is that the bismuth induction is made secure (this means that if the premise is true it's conclusion is 'most likely true') …by a fact about chemical elements: their samples are generally uniform in their physical properties… (Norton 2003, p. 651) The claim that this is a fact is an example of what Norton calls a material postulate. '…[I]f we know the physical properties of one sample of the element,' he says, the postulate gives us '…license to infer that other samples will most likely have the same properties' (ibid). If we were agnostic about the postulate and didn't know of anything else that might keep unobserved bismuth from melting at different temperatures than observed samples, it would be epistemically imprudent to believe (b) on the basis of (a). By contrast the wax induction is infirm (i.e., the truth of it's premise doesn't make its conclusion probable enough to merit acceptance) because wax samples differ from one other with regard to the chemical factors that determine their melting points.
Norton doesn't appeal to the same facts that I would in support of the bismuth induction. I wouldn't call the assumptions that make good inductive arguments truth conducive 'postulates' unless that term is understood broadly enough to include contingent, testable, empirical generalizations. But apart from that, Norton's point is eminently sensible. Since for every secure inductive argument, there's an infirm argument of the same logical form, it must be facts rather than formal features that distinguish secure from infirm inductions. An inductive argument will be …truth conducive as opposed to being merely pragmatically or instrumentally useful, as long as the material postulates are strong enough to support it … How each induction will be truth conducive will depend upon the material postulate. (Norton 2003, p. 651) If truth conduciveness depends on the strength of the material postulate, strength must require truth, approximation to the truth, probability, or something of the kind. But the point I want to emphasize is that no matter how secure the bismuth induction may be, it is epistemically imprudent to accept it without good reasons to believe that it is supported by a true, approximately true, or acceptably probable material postulate. And as suggested above, the less reason you have to believe the material postulate, the less epistemically prudent it is for you to accept the induction.
Norton's example of a material postulate was a general assertion of brute fact. For someone who believes for epistemically good reasons that samples of the same chemical element share the same physical properties and that melting is one of them, it will be epistemically prudent to trust the bismuth induction and accept its conclusion. By the same token, it will be prudent to invoke the claim that bismuth melts at around 271 • C to explain an experimental practice, or what results when investigators follow it. It will not be epistemically prudent for someone who disbelieves or remains agnostic about the material postulate to accept any the generalization or use it to explain the experimental practice or its results.
Before we go on, it's worth digressing to note that a material postulate that is available to philosophers, historians, or sociologists in one historical setting, intellectual tradition, academic community, etc. may not be available to those in another. Nor need it have been available to the scientists whose work they try to understand or evaluate. For example what is known now about heat and chemical bonding and bond breaking provides better established and stronger support for the bismuth induction than any of the material postulates that were available to 18th or 19th century chemists. This should come as no surprise: we can't use what we don't know about to help us avoid error.
Norton's material postulate may be more palatable to liberal (and maybe even to constructive) empiricists than an appeal to mechanisms of bonding and bond breaking. That's because he formulated it without explicit appeal to unobservable bonds and the components of the mechanisms that make and break them. But it's hard to see how Norton's postulate could be confirmed and its application to the melting point of bismuth established without question begging unless one appeals to facts about hidden causal factors. 14 Thus It may be more prudent to accept the bismuth induction on the basis of facts about chemical bonding than by appeal to the generalization Norton proposed. Analogous considerations hold for the generalizations about condensation and supercooling, that Hill relied on to eliminate artifacts.
The trouble with constructive and liberal empiricists is that their views about the goals of science assume that there are regularity phenomena for scientific theories to save even though the empirical adequacy of claims about many regularities that extend beyond observed instances can only established through inductive inferences whose truth conduciveness depends on causal factors that do not register on their senses or their equipment. By forbidding their adherents to commit themselves to claims about things that are unobservable in this sense, constructive and liberal empiricists forbid them from accepting the material postulates without which it is epistemically imprudent for them to believe in regularity phenomena.
Degrees of epistemic prudence
I am indebted to Ken Schaffner for pointing out that Snell's law seems to have been epistemically well established long before physicists had any way to decide whether refraction is a wave or a particle phenomenon, let alone what makes light change direction when it travels out of one medium and into another. If the security of an inductive inference depends on material posits and epistemically good reasons to accept them, how could it have been epistemically prudent for early physicists to accept Snell's law? The answer is that the physicists had reason to think that light must consist, or most probably consists of waves or particles, and that the regularities Snell describes can be maintained by either a particle or a wave mechanism. Just how epistemically prudent it was for such physicists to believe Snell's law describes a genuine phenomenon would depend on how good those reasons are. A reasonable belief that there is a mechanism of some kind to do the job wouldn't warrant as much confidence as well confirmed ideas about how the mechanism operates. A commitment to Snell's law based on weak evidence for claims about refraction mechanisms would be less prudent than commitment based on good evidence for such claims. In short, epistemic prudence comes in degrees and depends upon a variety of considerations. The example doesn't show that material postulates are unnecessary. All it shows is that epistemic prudence allows us to accept (perhaps without much confidence) the conclusions of inductive arguments that lack less than perfect support. Thus although we should expect some commitments to Snell's law to have been epistemically imprudent, we should also expect that others were minimally prudent, others more prudent, and perhaps that still others were models of epistemic virtue. It would be epistemically vicious to accept the conclusion of an inductive generalization on the basis of an inference whose security rests on epistemic posits one believes to be false. To accept an induction on the basis of posits one neither believes nor disbelieves is only slightly less imprudent. My objection to constructive and liberal empiricism is that is just what these views endorse.
6 Conclusion: how to be a good empiricist I've sketched examples to illustrate that neither constructive nor liberal empiricism accurately reflect the goals, attitudes, or beliefs of working scientists. More importantly, these empiricisms are as unsatisfactory normatively as they are descriptively. If what I've said about induction is correct, anyone who abides by liberal or constructive empiricist constraints must conclude that for all they know, Hodgkin's, Huxley's, Hill's, and a great many other scientists' best work may well have been a colossal waste of time and effort. It would be a waste of time to investigate or attempt to manipulate unobservable causal factors. And it would be a waste of time to try to save regularity phenomena in the absence of minimally adequate inductive arguments to show that the regularities obtain. Because inductive arguments typically depend for their security on facts about imperceptible causal factors that do not register on experimental equipment, It follows that constructive and liberal empiricisms are philosophies fit only for skeptics.
An epistemically prudent empiricism much better suited to the philosophical, historical, and sociological investigations of scientific practice would allow commitment to claims about unobservable phenomena (including causal factors and processes and not just regularities) that can be legitimately inferred from perceptual and instrument generated data. That kind of empiricism would countenance beliefs about solar neutrinos even though they cannot interact with the senses as required for perception, or interact directly with equipment to move needles, expose photographic plates, initiate tracings, affect computer displays, make noises, and so on. By embracing an empiricism that tolerates inferences from data to unobservable phenomena, philosophers, historians, and sociologists can direct our attention away from sterile debates about such things as what is and what is not observable, what if anything we can see through a microscope, whether observational evidence consists of perceptual experiences or features of the things observers perceive and so on. It would direct us instead toward what I think are much more interesting questions about how data are produced and interpreted, and about the causal processes and mechanisms that determine how safe it is to accept inductive generalizations. And it would direct our attention toward fruitful questions about the cognitive, contextual, and other factors that influence the degree to which it is epistemically prudent for investigators working in different laboratories in different historical and social settings to accept material posits and the inductive generalizations they support.
Some one will want to object that what I think of as good empiricism isn't empiricism at all. But even if it isn't the empiricism of Locke, Hume, Mill, Duhem, and their followers, it incorporates what I think was traditional empiricism's best idea. You don't have to agree with traditional empiricist theories of meaning, theory testing, concept formation, causality, causal explanation, etc., to embrace the principle that the natural sciences should concern themselves exclusively with things to which observational evidence can provide reasonably secure epistemic access. To accept that, you needn't follow Locke in holding that natural science is concerned only with things that can be constructed from perceptions. You don't have to accept Duhem's idea that scientists should devote themselves to producing, describing, and unifying general descriptions of experimental results without looking for causes. You don't have to follow Hume and try to replace ideas about causal processes and causes with ideas about regularities and psychological expectations. To be good empiricists philosophers would have to relax the constraints of constructive and liberal empiricism and acknowledge how much investigators can learn by producing, analyzing, and interpreting data. But that agrees perfectly well with the central empiricist requirement that scientists must concern themselves with things to which observational evidence gives them epistemic access.
